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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical model to show that in sectors where workers invest
in ¯rm speci¯c knowledge employment protection legislation can raise employment, pro-
ductivity and welfare. The model also predicts a U-shaped relation between ¯ring costs
and unemployment. Finally, it gives a rationale for the observation that more educated
workers tend to have better protected jobs.
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1 Introduction
When labor markets in di®erent countries are compared, the popular press tends to emphasize
di®erences in employment protection. Employment protection legislation has long been blamed
for the poor labor market performance in most European countries. To illustrate, the fact that
unemployment is substantially lower in the US has often been attributed to the °exibility
of the US labor market. Not only the popular press but also the economics literature has
pointed out detrimental e®ects of employment protection. Because of the negative e®ect on
the speed of reallocation, employment protection may have a negative e®ect on welfare. By
slowing down the reallocation from old and declining sectors to new and dynamic sectors,
employment protection may drive average productivity down and welfare. This is the central
argument of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). They stress the large magnitude of reallocation
within developed economies and the negative welfare e®ects of policies increasing the costs of
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1reallocation. They calibrate a general equilibrium model and show that a ¯ring tax equivalent
to one year's wages would reduce consumption by about 2 percent. The mechanism through
which consumption losses arise is the fall in average productivity due to ine±cient allocation
of resources within the economy.
Although there is some consensus on the e®ects of employment protection on the speed
of reallocation on the labor market(countries with high employment protection typically show
higher unemployment durations and lower unemployment in- and out°ows), the empirical ev-
idence about the e®ects of employment protection on the level of unemployment is mixed.
Di®erences in employment protection across countries are not very much related to di®erences
in unemployment rates.
Furthermore, the literature provides several arguments legitimating the existence of em-
ployment protection. In the presence of market failures, employment protection could be a
second-best instrument and foster welfare. Pissarides (2001) argues that severance payments
can be justi¯ed in the presence of imperfect insurance markets. Kuhn (1992) shows that manda-
tory notice reduces ine±ciencies in wage setting that arise otherwise, when ¯rms have private
information about their future activity (or closing decisions). In this imperfect environment,
wages serve as a signalling device to reveal the future plans of ¯rms. Workers use the informa-
tion to decide whether to quit their ¯rm or not. Firms who know they will remain active need
to set su±ciently high wages to signal credibly their future to their workers, thereby wasting
resources to provide information. Mandatory notice requires bad ¯rms to inform their workers
about future closures and good ¯rms do not need a credible signal anymore.
Another rationale for the existence of employment protection is when the social value of
a match is higher than its private value. Zoega and Booth (2003) show that employment
protection increases welfare when the worker's human capital embodies more than match-
speci¯c skills. In their model, the human capital of workers include both ¯rm-speci¯c and
industry-speci¯c skills. Firms decide whether to lay o® workers, knowing that workers will quit
in the next period with a certain exogenous probability. Quitting workers leave the ¯rm for
another ¯rm within the sector, and laid o® workers become unemployed. If they quit, workers
lose their ¯rm-speci¯c skills but keep the industry-skills. Because of this exogenous probability,
¯rms discount the future more than it is socially optimal. As a consequence, too many workers
are laid o®. They show that the social optimum can be reached with positive redundancy
payments.
Finally, non-contractibility of the behavior of workers could justify employment protection as
well. Again, in a stochastic environment, where employment relationships end with a certain
probability, and where workers can invest in ¯rm-speci¯c skills, employment protection can
help stimulate this type of investments, that would otherwise be suboptimal because of hold-
up problems (Teulings and Hartog (1998)). Some papers show that employment protection
also determines the mix of skills workers invest in. Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) argue that
employment protection gives workers incentives to invest in ¯rm-speci¯c skills, while the absence
of employment protection would stimulate investments in general, portable skills. Wasmer
(2002) uses a similar argument and suggests that American workers invest more in general skills
while European workers invest more in ¯rm-speci¯c skills. Suedekum and Ruehmann (2003)
2argue that employment protection has an ambiguous e®ect on speci¯c investments though.
They model employment protection as a redundancy payment. In that case, employment
protection induces a lethargy e®ect, as the penalty associated with a redundancy is lower than
without employment protection. The lower penalty discourages speci¯c investments. On the
other hand, employment protection increases the probability of obtaining the positive returns on
speci¯c investments (speci¯c investments increase worker's earnings). Which e®ect dominates
depends on the importance of the earnings'returns on speci¯c investments. Nickell and Layard
(1999) argue as well that employment protection may stimulate growth. The explanation they
provide is that productivity improvements depend on the cooperation of workers, while also
substantive participation requires training. To illustrate their argument they present cross-
country estimates of productivity growth from which it appears that employment protection is
the only institution that has a positive e®ect whereas the other labor market institutions do
not seem to have any e®ect on growth.
The current paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we use the
argument that employment protection stimulates worker's investments in ¯rm-speci¯c skills
and integrate it in a general equilibrium search framework. Employment protection is modelled
¯rst as a ¯ring tax, representing a direct cost at separation (paper work) for ¯rms. We show
that from a welfare point of view the optimal level of employment protection is strictly positive.
At low levels of employment protection, the positive e®ect on worker's investments dominates
the e®ect on separation costs. As the ¯ring cost increases, the marginal bene¯t of employment
protection falls because e®ort is increasingly costly and, at some point, the e®ect on separation
costs dominates. Job creation falls, unemployment rises and therefore welfare decreases. The
non-linear character of the relationship between employment protection and unemployment,
derived from the model, could explain why the empirical evidence is mixed.
Second, we show that the optimal level of employment protection is not necessarily identical
for all ¯rms and workers. As Booth and Zoega (2003) and Suedekum and Ruehmann (2003), we
argue that the positive welfare e®ects of employment protection are larger in sectors where ¯rm-
speci¯c skills matter more. We also argue that optimal employment protection di®ers across
workers. All else equal, low productive workers are more vulnerable to negative shocks and
have therefore lower incentives to invest in speci¯c skills. This remains true at any given level
of ¯ring cost. The marginal bene¯ts of employment protection are higher for high productive
workers than for low productive workers. Optimally, high productive workers should receive
more protection.
Finally, we introduce a second type of externality which could justify the introduction of
¯ring costs. We introduce a redistribution system from employed to unemployed workers. Taxes
are levied on employed workers to ¯nance unemployment bene¯ts for unemployed workers. This
redistribution system raises the social value of a match above its private value. In a world
without employment protection, workers and ¯rms would destroy too many matches compared
to the social optimum.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of stylized facts on employ-
ment protection regulation. Section 3 analyzes formally the trade o® of employment protection:
more e®ort investment by the employee vs higher costs for ¯rms and therefore less vacancies.
3We use a one-shot version of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model. Using
such a static framework allows us to add a worker's training decision to the model. Section
4 uses simulations to illustrate that some job protection is better than no protection at all
when ¯rm speci¯c human capital investments are important. Furthermore, it shows that the
model can account for the empirical observation that more educated workers enjoy higher job
protection. Section 5 provides empirical evidence of employment protection a®ecting economic
growth. Using a data set of OECD countries we ¯nd that at low levels of employment pro-
tection growth increases as protection increases, at higher levels of employment protection an
increase of protection has a negative e®ect on economic growth. Section 6 concludes.
2 Employment protection - stylized facts
Employment protection refers to regulations on hiring and ¯ring of employees. It concerns con-
ditions for using temporary or ¯xed-term contracts, training requirements but also redundancy
procedures, mandated pre-noti¯cation periods and severance payments, special requirements
for collective dismissals and short-time work schemes (see OECD (1999) for an overview). The
common element in these rules is that they a®ect adjustment costs and thereby job tenure.
To measure the strictness of employment protection Belot and Van Ours (2001) have con-
structed an indicator. This EPL-indicator combines information with respect to open-ended
contracts, ¯xed-term contracts and temporary work agencies. A higher value of the indicator
denotes stricter employment protection, with 1 being the maximum. Table 1 presents this EPL
indicator for a set of countries and time periods. We report here the OECD countries where
changes have taken place between the beginning of the 60s and the early nineties. Australia,
Canada, Ireland and the US feature low job protection over the whole period. Countries where
job protection does not vary much over time are (in order of increasing protection) UK, Nor-
way, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. Finland is the only country where protection
only moved up. Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and New Zealand all experienced a
considerable fall in protection in the 90s. We use this variation across countries and time in
our empirical analysis below.
Temporary contracts are also a way for ¯rms to avoid much of the cost of employment
protection.1 These contracts allow ¯rms to adjust employment with relatively low costs to
the variations in demand. Temporary contracts may also be used as a step in the screening
process towards a permanent employment relationship, or as a form of active labor market
policy (OECD, 1999).2 More relevant for the purpose of this study, temporary employment is
1Temporary employment covers in general two categories of contracts: ¯xed-term contracts and temporary
work agency (TWA) contracts. Fixed duration contracts are employment relationships concluded directly
between the employer and the worker. TWA contracts are employment relationships between a temporary work
agency and the worker, the latter working for and under the control of a user ¯rm (Peeters (1999)). See Delsen
(1995) for an overview of the various de¯nitions of temporary employment across OECD countries.
2The majority of temporary workers was employed the year before (OECD, 1996). However there is a
reasonable part (varying between 8.7% in Spain and 31.9 % in Luxembourg, 1994) that was not participating
to the labor market. When one looks at the status of temporary employed one year later, it appears that
4unequally spread among the population and sectors of activities. Bentolila and Dolado (1994)
argue that unskilled and semi-skilled workers are over-represented in this type of employment.
De Grip et al. (1997) note that sixty-three percent of all temporary employed are in low-skilled
occupations. More evidence goes in that direction. OECD (1999) shows that in many countries
the regulation of contracts is di®erent for blue and white collars. Blue collars are typically
unskilled and bene¯t from less legal employment protection than white collars.
Furthermore, the OECD (1997) presents retention rates for various education levels in
OECD countries. The retention rate is de¯ned as the proportion of employees in a certain
year who will still be with their current employer ¯ve years later. As shown in table 2, in
most countries, retention rates rise with education levels. In particular, comparing primary-
lower secondary education with university education, retention rates are higher for the latter
category in all countries. To a large extent the same holds for white-collar workers that have
higher retention rates than blue-collar workers in most of the countries presented in Table 2.
The OECD (1997) concludes that "there is some tendency for low-educated workers to be less
secure in their jobs in the majority of countries for which data are available".
These observations are in line with the predictions of our model. It is expensive to give
high protection to unskilled workers because it is relatively likely that this ¯ring cost will be
incurred. Furthermore, ¯rm speci¯c human capital investments are less likely to be relevant for
low skilled workers. The lower job protection explains the lower retention rates for low skilled
workers. But even for given job protection, the lower productivity of less skilled workers makes
it more likely that a negative industry shock brings the value of the match below the outside
options for worker and ¯rm. Hence even for given job protection, the model below predicts
that job retention rates rise with educational achievement.
3 The model
This section presents a model formalizing the idea that ¯ring costs stimulate ¯rm speci¯c
training by the employee and hence can be welfare enhancing.3 To make this point most
forcefully, ¯ring costs are assumed to be a pure waste (e.g. paper work involved in ¯ring an
employee). Below we also consider other possibilities for the ¯ring costs and discuss other
contractual arrangements between ¯rm and worker.
The model is a one shot version of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) matching model. Similar
one shot versions have been used by Boone and Bovenberg (2002) and Hosios (1990). The
simpli¯cation allows us to introduce an additional decision margin (worker's training e®ort)
while analytical results can still be derived. The model consists of four stages. The timing is
as follows.
At t = 0, ¯rms post vacancies v at a cost cv per vacancy and workers supply inelastically one
two-thirds are still under a temporary contract in Spain and Germany, while an important proportion of them
bene¯ts from a permanent contract in France (31.7%) and Great Britain (25.3%).
3See the appendix for the proofs of the results.
5unit of search intensity.4 Workers are distributed on the unit interval [0;1] with measure one.
The number of workers and ¯rms that match is determined by a matching function m(u;v)
where the number of unemployed u in this one shot game equals the total mass of workers,
u = 1. De¯ning market tightness as µ = v
u = v, the matching function can be written as
m(µ) = m(1;µ); with the usual assumptions: m(0) = 0;m0 (µ) > 0;m00 (µ) < 0 and
m(µ)
µ is
decreasing in µ. Once the worker and ¯rm are matched, the suitability of the worker for the
job, x, is revealed. We assume that x is the same for everyone.
Because workers are ex ante identical, all workers that are matched with a ¯rm get a contract
which stipulates a ¯ring cost cf.5 The fraction (1 ¡ m(µ)) of workers that are not matched,
stay unemployed and receive unemployment bene¯t b ¸ 0.
At t = 1 the worker invests e®ort e at cost ° (e) to raise productivity in his match. E®ort e
is ¯rm speci¯c, nonveri¯able by a court and therefore noncontractable. Further, the e®ort cost
° (e) is borne by the worker. One can think here of e®ort invested by the worker to get to know
people working in the ¯rm, the procedures used, e®ort to help colleagues or e®ort invested in
a training program.
After e®ort e has been sunk, the industry conditions ¶ are revealed at t = 2. The industry
shock ¶ 2 R is randomly distributed with density function g (:) and distribution function G(:).
Total output of the match, y, equals the sum of the suitability for the job, the e®ort choice and
the industry shock. That is,
y = x + e + ¶: (1)
After ¶ has been revealed, it may be the case that ¶ is so low that the worker and ¯rm decide
to split up. In that case, the ¯rm pays the ¯ring cost cf and the worker becomes unemployed.
These unemployed workers receive an unemployment bene¯t b (just as workers that did not
match with a ¯rm at t = 0).
The worker and ¯rm combinations that do not separate produce output y at t = 3. Fur-
thermore, the ¯rm and the worker bargain about the wage rate. The ¯nal output good is the
numeraire (py = 1) and we assume that there are no other production costs than labor.
In the following subsections, the model is solved using backward induction. First, the wage
rate and pro¯ts are derived. Then we determine workers' e®ort choice e and number of vacancies
posted by ¯rms.
4One could endogenize workers' search e®ort by introducing a search cost function for workers. This would
complicate notation but does not a®ect the results. The reason for this is as follows. In this type of model,
agents tend to search too little because part of the surplus created goes to the government as tax revenue.
Firing costs in this context raise the wage for the worker and hence stimulates search. In this sense, the welfare
enhancing e®ect of ¯ring costs is strengthened by endogenizing workers' search e®ort.
5Strictly speaking there is also the possibility that x is so low that no one gets a contract. Since x is known
ex ante this implies that no vacancies are posted at t = 0. This irrelevant case is ignored and x is assumed to
be big enough.
63.1 Wages and pro¯ts
The surplus y is divided by the worker and the ¯rm using Nash bargaining. That is, the wage




¯ (y ¡ (1 + t)w ¡ T + cf)
1¡¯ ; (2)
where ¯ (1 ¡ ¯) is the bargaining power of the worker (¯rm), b is the unemployment bene¯t
level, t and T denote components of the wage tax levied by the government and cf is the ¯ring
cost. In terms of the Nash bargaining, b is the worker's fall back position and ¡cf is the fall
back position of the ¯rm. If the worker and ¯rm do not reach agreement on the wage, the worker
is ¯red and receives b and the ¯rm has to pay the ¯ring cost cf. From the Nash bargaining, it




(y ¡ T + cf) + (1 ¡ ¯)b (3)
¼ = (1 ¡ ¯)(y ¡ T ¡ (1 + t)b) ¡ ¯cf: (4)
Part of the surplus y that is not distributed to ¯rm or worker goes to the government as tax
income:
taxes = y ¡ w ¡ ¼ (5)
= tw + T: (6)
The worker and ¯rm separate after ¶ has been revealed if and only if the joint surplus they
generate is less than the sum of their outside options. Due to Nash bargaining, one can verify
that the following two conditions are identical:
¼ · ¡cf (7)
w · b: (8)
That is, the ¯rm and worker always agree on when to separate: pro¯ts are below the outside
option (¡cf) if and only if wages are below the outside option (b). Summarizing, we get the
following result.
Lemma 1 The ¯rm and the worker separate after ¶ has been revealed if and only if
y · e y
where
e y ´ (1 + t)b + T ¡ cf: (9)
Given x and e, the probability that the worker and ¯rm separate is given by
Pr(x + e + ¶ · e y) = G((1 + t)b + T ¡ cf ¡ e ¡ x): (10)
Hence, the worker and ¯rm continue after the industry shock ¶ if and only if output y
exceeds the gross wage costs of a wage equal to the unemployment bene¯t (worker's outside
option) minus the ¯ring cost (¯rm's outside option). For given values of e;b;t and T, a rise in
the ¯ring cost cf implies that fewer matches are dissolved.
73.2 E®ort choice
This section derives the e®ect of the ¯ring cost on worker's e®ort investment. To do this, the




(x + e + ¶ ¡ T + cf) + (1 ¡ ¯)b (11)
Note that the worker and ¯rm bargain over the wage after the e®ort e has been sunk. In other
words, there is a hold up problem. This is important for the welfare e®ects below. The worker










where the e®ort costs satisfy the assumptions ° (0) = 0;°0 (:);°00 (:) > 0. Raising the e®ort
level e raises the e®ort cost ° (e) and has two bene¯cial e®ects. First, as e goes up, it becomes
less likely that the worker is ¯red. Second, raising e raises the wage that the worker receives
if the match is not dissolved. The ¯rst order condition6 for this maximization problem implies
that marginal costs are equal to marginal bene¯ts:
°












The intuition for these results is as follows. As the ¯ring cost cf or the suitability x goes up,
it becomes less likely that the worker is ¯red. Therefore, the worker is willing to invest higher
e®ort e.
3.3 Vacancies
This section determines the number of vacancies that are created in the economy at t = 0.
Pro¯ts can be written explicitly as a function of e and ¶:
¼ (e;¶) = (1 ¡ ¯)(x + e + ¶ ¡ T ¡ (1 + t)b) ¡ ¯cf: (14)
6The second order condition is satis¯ed if °00 (e) ¡
¯
1+tg (e y ¡ e ¡ x) > 0. If °00 (e) ¡
¯
1+tg (e y ¡ e ¡ x) > 0
holds for all e ¸ 0 then equation (13) has a unique solution.
8Then the expected value of being matched with a worker equals
E (J) = ¡G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)cf +
Z +1
e y¡e¡x
¼ (e;¶)g (¶)d¶: (15)
We assume that there is free entry into the business of posting vacancies. Hence the vacancy







µ is the probability that a ¯rm is matched with a worker.
A rise in ¯ring costs reduces a ¯rm's expected pro¯ts for two reasons. First, it increases
the direct cost of separation and second, the wage goes up since the ¯ring cost improves a
worker's bargaining position relative to the ¯rm. This would suggest that a rise in ¯ring costs
is always bad news for the ¯rm. The next lemma derives conditions under which that is the
case. However, there is also a positive e®ect of the ¯ring cost for the ¯rm. Higher ¯ring costs
imply a higher e®ort investment by the worker and hence a higher surplus y to be divided. If
e®ort e is su±ciently elastic (or equivalently, ° (:) su±ciently linear), the last e®ect dominates
and the ¯rm gains as ¯ring costs go up.
Lemma 3 If G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)is close to 1 then
@E(J)
@cf < 0. There exist functions ° (e) such that
@E(J)
@cf > 0.
The intuition for the ¯rst e®ect is as follows. The bene¯cial e®ect for the ¯rm of a rise in cf is
that it raises worker's e®ort. However, if it is unlikely that the match survives (G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)is
close to 1) this e®ect on e®ort is small. On the other hand, if it is likely that the worker has to
be ¯red, a rise in cf raises expected ¯ring costs substantially. The second result says that there
are functions ° (:) such that the elasticity of e®ort with respect to cf is big. In that case, a
small increase in ¯ring costs leads to a big rise in e®ort and hence a big rise in a ¯rm's pro¯ts.
In that case, the rise in ¯ring costs is bene¯cial to the ¯rm, the ¯rm posts more vacancies and
we get lower unemployment.
3.4 Welfare and normative results
In the model there are two externalities which create bene¯cial e®ects of ¯ring costs. First,
there is a hold up problem which causes workers to underinvest in e®ort. A rise in ¯ring costs
induces a higher e®ort level and hence can be welfare enhancing, even though the ¯ring cost is
a pure waste from a social point of view (i.e. it is not a transfer). Second, because of taxation
the social value of a match exceeds the private value of a match. This causes the private parties
to dissolve too many matches. Some matches are dissolved which have a positive social value
because of the tax revenues generated by it and the unemployment bene¯t b saved by having
an employed worker instead of an unemployed one. Introducing a ¯ring cost stops some of
9these matches from being dissolved and hence can be welfare enhancing. This section derives
conditions under which the welfare maximizing ¯ring cost is strictly positive.
Welfare is de¯ned as the sum of utilities of workers and ¯rms. The expression for the
expected value of a match for a ¯rm is derived in equation (15) above. The analogous equation
for expected value for a worker of being matched with a ¯rm is




Welfare ­ can be written as
­ = (1 ¡ m(µ))b + m(µ)E (W) + m(µ)E (J) ¡ cvµ: (18)
Using the government budget constraint
taxes = g + [1 ¡ m(µ) + m(µ)G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)]b (19)
we can write welfare as
­ = ¡g + m(µ)
·
¡° (e) ¡ G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)cf +
Z +1
e y¡e¡x
(x + e + ¶)g (¶)d¶
¸
¡ cvµ: (20)
Maximizing welfare with respect to e®ort e yields that the ¯rst best e®ort level is determined
by
°
0 (e) = g (e y ¡ e ¡ x)((1 + t)b + T) + [1 ¡ G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)]: (21)
Simple comparison of this equation with (13) yields the following result.
Lemma 4 If t > 0 and (1 + t)b+T > 0 then the ¯rst best e®ort level exceeds the e®ort in the
private outcome.
There are two reasons for this e®ect. First, there is the hold up problem at the ¯rm level
(¯ < 1): the worker bears all the cost of the e®ort e but gets only a fraction of the gains.
However, not only is part of the additional output of the worker's e®ort shared with the ¯rm,
it is also shared by the government if t > 0. Hence, even if the ¯rm and worker could write a
contract that solves their hold up problem, we still have a hold up problem with the government
if the marginal wage tax is positive. Second, the matches with y 2 h0;(1 + t)b + T ¡ cfi are
dissolved because they yield no private surplus although they do yield social surplus if y > 0.
By raising e such matches with strictly positive social value are saved. Note that (1+t)b+T < 0
implies that the private value of a match is higher than social value. This works in the direction
of the government wanting to destroy more matches than private partners.
Next the socially optimal number of vacancies (or tightness) is compared with the private










10Multiplying both sides with µ
m(µ) and de¯ning the elasticity of the matching function as ® =
m0(µ)µ











Comparing this equation with the market outcome in equation (16) one gets the following
result.
Lemma 5 If the following two inequalities hold
® ¸ 1 ¡ ¯;
[1 ¡ G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)](T + (1 + t)b) +
¯
1 ¡ ¯
cf ¸ ° (e):
then the socially optimal tightness µ exceeds tightness in the private outcome (as determined by
(16)).
The intuition for these conditions is as follows. The ¯rst inequality is related to the Hosios
condition (see Hosios (1990)) and says that the ¯rm's bargaining power should not be too big.
The reason is that creating vacancies causes a negative external e®ect (congestion externality):
if a ¯rm opens an additional vacancy, the probability that other ¯rms are matched with a
worker is reduced (
m(µ)
µ is decreasing in µ). If the elasticity of the matching function ® equals
¯rm's bargaining power (1 ¡ ¯) this externality is internalized and ¯rms do not create too
many vacancies from a social point of view. Clearly, if ¯rm's bargaining power is even lower
(1 ¡ ¯ · ®) ¯rms are not overinvesting in vacancies. The second inequality compares parts
of the social surplus overlooked by the ¯rm. First, tax revenues on surviving matches do not
add to the ¯rm's surplus and hence the ¯rm tends to underinvest in vacancies. Second, part of
the ¯ring cost that is subtracted in ¯rm's pro¯ts goes in fact to the worker (cf raises worker's
wages) and is not lost from a social point of view. Finally, since the worker bears all of the e®ort
cost ° (e) the ¯rm does not take this cost into account when creating vacancies. This e®ect
tends to work in the direction of the ¯rm overinvesting in vacancies. The inequality implies
that the ¯rst two e®ects dominate the latter and hence the ¯rm underinvests in vacancies.




for cf 2 [0;¹ cfi where ¹ cf > 0.
This result implies that the socially optimal ¯ring cost is strictly positive, although the
¯ring cost is a pure waste from a social point of view. The intuition is that by raising the ¯ring
11cost (from cf = 0) workers' e®ort is increased which is below the social optimum and fewer
matches are destroyed which have a strictly positive social value.
This result cannot hold for all e®ort functions. Suppose for instance that e®ort is costless
until e = 1 and in¯nitely expensive for e > 1.7 Then all workers invest the socially optimal
e®ort level already and raising cf just raises costs for the economy (as ¯ring costs are a pure
waste). Hence, it must be the case that e®ort is su±ciently elastic to changes in cf to get the
positive welfare e®ect of cf.
The welfare maximizing ¯ring cost is ¯nite, because as cf ! +1, pro¯ts are reduced to
zero and hence no vacancies will be created.
3.5 The nature of ¯ring cost and contractual incompleteness
So far ¯ring costs were assumed to be a pure waste, say paper work needed to ¯re an employee.
Alternatively, one can distinguish ¯ring cost as a ¯ring tax paid to the government and severance
pay which is a ¯ring cost paid to the employee. For each of these types of ¯ring costs the welfare
e®ects of a rise in the ¯ring cost and the sort of contractual incompleteness one needs to assume
to defend government intervention in these cases are discussed.
In all three of these cases one needs to assume that the e®ort e of the worker is too low from
a social point of view. This can happen (as noted above) because the marginal wage tax t is
positive. Hence the social value of the surplus created by worker and ¯rm exceeds the private
value.8 Another reason why the worker underinvests in e®ort is the hold up problem at the
¯rm level. This happens if ¯ < 1 and e®ort is not contractible. We think here of a worker's
e®ort to cooperate with colleagues or to behave towards customers, which is indeed very hard
to verify in court. However, if this e®ort level were contractible, the hold up problem at the
¯rm level would disappear and this would no longer be an argument in favor of ¯ring costs.
To defend government intervention in the case where the ¯ring cost is a pure waste (created
by the government), it is necessary to answer the question 'if this ¯ring cost creates additional
private surplus, why don't the worker and ¯rm write a contract themselves saying that money
should be burned in case the worker is ¯red?' There are two answers to this question. First,
although the ¯ring cost may create additional welfare, it may be the case that the ¯rm loses
due to the ¯ring cost (i.e.
@E(J)
@cf < 0). The only way in which the worker can induce the
¯rm to sign a contract stipulating a ¯ring cost is to compensate the ¯rm ex ante. In other
words, the worker bribes the ¯rm to sign such a contract. Assuming that the worker has a
liquidity constraint rules out such a contract and necessitates government intervention. Another
argument why government intervention is needed even if the ¯rm would gain from the ¯ring
cost (i.e.
@E(J)
@cf > 0) is given by Nickell and Layard (1999). They claim that adverse selection
problems may be an important reason why private ¯rms in the US do not o®er employment
protection themselves. The idea is here that there are two types of workers: one type likes an
easy life and job security, the other is willing to work hard and does not mind a bit of risk.
7That is, ° (:) is of the form: ° (e) =
½
0 if e 2 [0;1]
+1 otherwise .
8Since we assume that e®ort e is not veri¯able by court, it is reasonable to assume that ° (e) is not tax
deductible.
12By o®ering (unilaterally) a contract with high cf, a ¯rm attracts disproportionately the wrong
type of worker. Hence ¯rms only o®er contracts with low ¯ring costs.
If the ¯ring cost takes the form of a transfer to the government (¯ring tax), then it is less
surprising that a higher ¯ring cost can raise welfare because the ¯ring cost is not a waste from
a social point of view. If there is a hold up problem, the ¯ring tax is an excellent way for the
government to raise revenue as it raises e±ciency instead of decreasing it.
If the ¯ring cost is a transfer to the employee (severance pay), it is again easier to get a
welfare enhancing rise in the ¯ring cost because it is not a waste from a social point of view.
Note that in this case the level of the ¯ring cost will be lower than in the two other cases because
of the following moral hazard problem on the worker's side. One reason why the worker exerts
e®ort is to avoid bankruptcy by the ¯rm. If the worker gets severance pay cf in case the match
is dissolved, there is less incentive to try to avoid bankruptcy since the worker now gets b + cf
instead of just b.
Summarizing, to get the welfare enhancing e®ect of ¯ring costs one needs to assume that
the worker's e®ort is too low from a social point of view. This happens if there is a positive
marginal tax rate and e®ort is not contractible. In order to make a case for the government
to stipulate contracts with ¯ring cost one can assume either that the worker has a liquidity
constraint which prevents him from bribing the ¯rm into a contract with ¯ring costs or that
¯rms face an adverse selection problem with di®erent types of employees.
4 A numerical example
This section uses simulations to illustrate the following two points. First, we give an example
of an e®ort function ° (e) (as in proposition 1) which leads to strictly positive optimal ¯ring
costs. Second, we show how the model here can account for the stylized fact discussed above
that more educated workers get more employment protection. From this follows that more
educated workers have higher retention rates (as in Table 2).
For simplicity, we assume that there are no unemployment bene¯ts and no government
expenditures and therefore there are no taxes: b = g = t = T = 0. Next suppose that
industry shocks are normally distributed, in particular ¶ » N(0;4): The matching function has
the following form: m(u;v) = au®v1¡®, with a = 0:9 and ® = 0:5: The other parameters are
speci¯ed as follows: ¯ = 0:5; cv = 2; ' = 0:1;°(e) = 1
2'e2: This combination of parameter
values was chosen to ensure plausible values of unemployment rates over a wide range of values
for x. First, consider the case where x = 1:5: The ¯rst column of Table 3 shows the simulation
results for the case with no ¯ring costs, cf = 0: The e®ort chosen by workers equals e = 4:7
and this induces the employers to open up so many vacancies that every worker is matched
with a job at t = 0. However, 6.1% of the matches break up after the industry conditions ¶ are
revealed. Therefore, total unemployment equals 6.1%. Pro¯ts equal 3.15 and welfare 2.73.
If ¯ring costs are introduced, initially there is a decline in unemployment and an increase in
welfare. This is shown in Figure 1. At low values of ¯ring cost cf, an increase in cf gives workers








































Figure 1: Welfare and unemployment as a function of ¯ring cost.
matches is destroyed. For high values of cf this e®ect is dominated by the negative e®ect of
¯ring costs on ¯rms' pro¯ts. In that case, a rise in cf reduces welfare and raises unemployment.
Figure 1 shows that, under the set of parameter values chosen, the optimal value of the ¯ring
costs is c¤
f = 1:4: At this level of ¯ring costs unemployment is at its lowest point and welfare
is maximized with a value of 2.75. The second column of Table 3 shows the full simulation
results in this optimum. E®ort is now higher, therefore productivity is higher and less matches
are destroyed. The unemployment rate now equals 2.6%. Pro¯ts are lower but because there
is more employment and productivity has increased welfare has also increased.
Next, we turn to the observation above that more educated workers typically enjoy higher
job protection. We capture a worker's education here by his suitability for the job x. Table
3 shows that for x = 1:5, the optimal ¯ring costs equals c¤
f = 1:4. Now consider the case
of less educated workers with x = 1 (and other parameters as above). Table 3 shows that
in this case it is optimal to o®er less employment protection as the optimal ¯ring cost equals
c¤
f = 1:2. Comparing the columns with optimal ¯ring costs for x = 1:5 and x = 1 we see that
the probability of separation is higher in the case of x = 1 and hence retention rates are lower.
Less educated workers have a higher probability of being ¯red because they are less productive
(in terms of x) and hence, ceteris paribus, are more likely to end up below the threshold ~ y
in lemma 1. This raises the probability that the ¯ring cost has to be incurred and hence the
optimal ¯ring cost goes down as x falls. The lower ¯ring cost raises ~ y and reduces e®ort for
less educated workers, thereby reducing retention rates further.
The theoretical positive relationship between education and optimal level of employment
protection seems to correspond to what we observe in practice.
Finally, note that, in contrast to the case with x = 1:5, with x = 1 we see that moving from
cf = 0 to the optimal ¯ring cost c¤
f = 1:2 the unemployment rate goes up.9 Hence it is not


































Figure 2: Welfare and total e®ort as a function of the ¯ring cost.
always the case that maximal welfare corresponds to minimal unemployment.
5 Empirical analysis
As mentioned in the introduction, the relation between employment protection and unemploy-
ment levels is not as clear as is sometimes suggested. Figure 1 indicates that indeed the model
here predicts a nonlinear relation between employment protection and unemployment which is
not monotonically increasing. Figure 2 (based on the same simulation as Figure 1) shows the
relation between ¯ring costs and workers' e®ort levels. Since e®ort levels are not observable, we
cannot test this relation directly. Yet, this section suggests that the inverse U relation between
¯ring costs and e®orts to improve e±ciency is empirically relevant.
The way we test the model here is by assuming that workers' e®orts which raise output (see
equation (1)) can in a repeated game setting be viewed as contributing to economic growth.
Hence we test whether there is an inverse U relation between employment protection and growth
of GDP per capita.
This section builds on Nickell and Layard (1999) who ¯nd a signi¯cant positive e®ect of
employment protection legislation on labor productivity growth in OECD countries (regression
on ¯rst-di®erences over the period 1976-1992). We use ¯ve-year average data from 7 time
periods (1960-94) on growth of GDP per capita and an employment protection index (Belot
and Van Ours (2001), see also Table 1) to run a similar type of regression. We estimated the
following model:
¢
yi;t = ®i + ®t + ¯1EPi;t¡1 + ¯2EP
2
i;t¡1 + ¯3Zi;t¡1 + "i;t
where i relates to the country and t to the time period,
¢
y is the per capita growth of GDP,
15®i are the country ¯xed e®ects, ®t are the time period ¯xed e®ects, EP is the employment
protection index, Z is a vector of other institutional variables, and "i;t the error term.10
Table 4 shows the estimation results. The ¯rst column presents the estimate results without
the quadratic term of the employment protection index and without the other institutional
variables, as a benchmark. As shown the coe±cient of the employment protection index is
negative, but insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. Including a quadratic term improves the
parameter estimates substantially. Now, the linear term has a positive e®ect while the quadratic
employment protection term has a negative e®ect. According to the values of both coe±cients
maximum growth is where the employment protection index has a value of about 0.5. The third
column includes additional institutional variables that probably play a role in the economic
performance of OECD countries. Whereas both coe±cients of the employment protection
variables are still signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, none of the other institutional variables has
a signi¯cant e®ect on economic growth. Therefore, the data suggest that there is an inverse U
relationship between employment protection and economic growth. We interpret this as lending
support to the model here which predicts an inverse U relation between ¯ring costs and e®ort
to raise productivity in a match.
Going back to Table 1 we see that the following picture emerges. From the point of view of
per capita growth of GDP the optimal employment protection is around 0.5. Of course this is
an imprecise estimate if only because as we stressed in the previous section optimal employment
protection is not necessary identical for all ¯rms and workers. Nevertheless, if we consider 0.4-
0.6 to be the optimal range, the parameter estimates suggests that employment protection in
the early 1990s was too low in countries like Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Switzerland,
the UK and the US while employment protection is too high in countries like Finland, Italy
and Sweden. Note, however, that for countries like Italy and Sweden employment protection is
moving closer to the optimal range.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the welfare e®ects of employment protection in an environment where
workers invest in ¯rm speci¯c knowledge. We show that in this environment employment pro-
tection can increase the worker's training e®ort by raising the expected duration of the job.
Thus, employment protection legislation can raise welfare, employment and average productiv-
ity. Our model also provides a rationale for the observation that more educated workers tend
to have better protected jobs. From an empirical analysis of cross-country time series data it
appears that employment protection legislation has a non-linear e®ect on economic growth. At
low levels of employment protection an increase in protection stimulates growth, at high levels
of employment protection an increase in protection is harmful to growth. This corresponds
to our theoretical model with an inverse U relation between ¯ring costs and e®ort to increase
10The data sources used are the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) Total Economy
Database for economic growth, Belot and Van Ours (2001) for the employment protection index:, union density
and replacement rates, and labor tax rates. Because we use lagged explanatory variables 108 datapoints are
available (6 time periods, 18 countries).
16e±ciency. We also ¯nd an inverse U relation between employment protection and welfare.
As our research indicates the optimal level of employment protection is not identical for all
¯rms and workers and therefore not identical for all countries. From a policy point of view
both our theoretical results and our empirical ¯ndings are interesting in the sense that they
suggest that currently a lot of countries may not have an optimal employment protection. For
some countries employment protection may be too low causing workers to underinvest in ¯rm-
speci¯c skills. For other countries employment protection may be too high causing employers
to underinvest in hiring workers.
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19Appendix A. Proofs of results
This appendix contains the proofs of the results in the main text.
Proof of lemma 2















@cf > 0 because the term in square brackets is positive due to the second order condition
for e. In a similar way one can derive @e
@x > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
The expression for E (J) in equation (15) can be written as





The e®ect of cf on the number of vacancies follows from the e®ect of cf on the expected value
of a match E (J):
@E (J)
@cf







Clearly, if [1 ¡ G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)] ¼ 0, we have that
@E(J)
@cf < 0.
Substituting the expression for @e
@cf in (A.1) into equation (A.3) we get
@E (J)
@cf








1+tg (e y ¡ e ¡ x)
:
Let ^ e denote equilibrium value. Then, using a second order Taylor expansion, ° (e) can be
written as ° (e) = ° (^ e) + °0 (^ e)(e ¡ ^ e) + 1
2Á(e ¡ ^ e)
2 where Á = °00 (³) for some ³ between e
and ^ e. Changing the concavity of the function ° (:) around ^ e (while keeping °0 (^ e) unchanged)
a®ects how elastic e reacts to cf, but does not a®ect the equilibrium ^ e. In other words, one can
vary Á without changing ^ e: It is routine to verify that as Á comes close to
¯
1+tg (e y ¡ ^ e ¡ x), the
e®ect of cf on e becomes big enough to make
@E(J)
@cf > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
Since cµ
m(µ) is increasing in µ, the socially optimal number of vacancies exceeds the private
number of vacancies if and only if
®
·





¸ (1 ¡ ¯)
½









20If ® ¸ 1 ¡ ¯ a su±cient condition for this inequality to hold is
¡° (e) ¡ G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)cf +




which can be written as
[1 ¡ G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)](T + (1 + t)b) +
¯
1 ¡ ¯
cf ¸ ° (e):
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
As shown in lemma 3, if ° (:) is su±ciently elastic then we have
@E(J)
@cf > 0. It is clear
that
@E(Ve)
@cf > 0 because cf raises the wage rate. Furthermore, Nash bargaining implies that
w(e;¶) ¸ b for all matches that survive. Together with ° (0) = 0 it follows that E (Ve) > b.
Hence
@E(J)
@cf > 0 implies that @µ
@cf > 0 and hence
@[(1¡m(µ))b+m(µ)E(Ve)]
@µ > 0. Furthermore, by
choosing ° (:) such that in the market equilibrium (determined by °0 (e)) it is the case that
[1 ¡ G(e y ¡ e ¡ x)](T + (1 + t)b) +
¯
1 ¡ ¯
cf ¸ ° (e)













































































Source: Belot and van Ours (2001)
Table 1: Employment protection legislation in OECD countries

















































Table 2: Retention rates in OECD countries by education and occupation 1990-1995
22x = 1:5 x = 1:0
cf = 0:0 c¤































































t¡values based on robust standard errors in parentheses; * Signi¯cant at 10% level, ** Signi¯cant at % level
Table 4: Estimation results
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